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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 The Government appeals from the order of the District 
Court dismissing the indictment against Melissa Huet 
(“Huet”) with prejudice.  Huet was charged with aiding and 
abetting possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 2.  The District 
Court dismissed the indictment on the basis that:  (1) it failed 
to state an offense for aiding and abetting under § 922(g)(1) 
and § 2; and (2) even if it did state an offense, the charge 
violated Huet‟s rights under the Second Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution.  For the reasons set forth below, we will 
reverse and remand. 
I. 
 On June 5, 2008, a federal grand jury sitting in the 
Western District of Pennsylvania returned a three-count 
indictment against Huet and her paramour, Marvin Hall 
(“Hall”).  Counts One and Two, respectively, charged Hall 
with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and transfer of unregistered 
firearms, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(e).  Count Three 
(“Count Three” or “the Indictment”) charged Huet with 
 3 
knowingly aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm by 
a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
1
 and 
§ 2(a)
2
.  On January 29, 2010, Hall pled guilty to Count One, 
and was sentenced to time served.  On November 22, 2010, 
the District Court issued an order dismissing Count Three 
with prejudice.  The Government filed a timely notice of 
appeal. 
 The allegations in the Indictment stem from an 
undercover FBI investigation into the activities of Morgan 
Jones (“Jones”) in Clarion County, Pennsylvania.  The 
investigation focused on attempts to purchase illegal firearms 
and explosive devices for criminal activities, as well as the 
potential manufacturing and detonation of explosive devices.  
During their probe, FBI agents met Hall and Huet, who lived 
together.  Over the next nine months, agents gathered 
                                              
1
 Section 922(g)(1) states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person – who 
has been convicted in any court of, a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in 
interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or 
affecting commerce, any firearm or 
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or 
ammunition which has been shipped or 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 
2
 Section 2(a) states:  “Whoever commits an offense 
against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, 
induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a 
principal.” 
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evidence allegedly connecting Hall and Huet to various 
criminal activities, and on June 6, 2008, a valid search 
warrant (the “search warrant”) was executed on the couple‟s 
Clarion County home.  Agents seized an SKS, Interordnance 
M59/66 rifle (“SKS rifle”) from an upstairs bedroom. 
Although Huet is legally permitted to possess a 
firearm, Hall was convicted in 1999 of possessing an 
unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and 
is therefore prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm.  
After being informed of the raid, Huet allegedly told 
investigators that the guns in the house belonged to her and 
that it was not illegal for her to purchase weapons.  Despite 
Huet‟s assertions that she alone possessed the SKS rifle, the 
Government sought and obtained an indictment charging Hall 
with illegal possession of the weapon, and Huet with aiding 
and abetting Hall‟s possession. 
Huet moved to dismiss Count Three pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(3)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
3
 on 
the basis that the Indictment failed to state an offense under 
§ 922(g)(1) and § 2.  Count Three states: 
From on or about August 10, 2007, to on or 
about January 11, 2008, in the Western District 
of Pennsylvania, the defendant, Melissa A. 
Huet, knowingly and unlawfully aided and 
abetted the possession of a firearm, that is an 
SKS assault rifle, in and affecting interstate 
                                              
3
 Rule 12(b)(3)(B) provides:  “[A]t any time while the 
case is pending, the court may hear a claim that the 
indictment . . . fails to . . . state an offense.” 
 5 
commerce, by Marvin E. Hall, who had 
previously been convicted on or about March 
12, 1999, in the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania . . . of the 
crime of Possession of Unregistered Firearms, 
an offense which is punishable by a term of 
imprisonment in excess of one year.  In 
violation of Title 18, United States Code, 
Sections 922(g)(1) and 2. 
In granting Huet‟s Rule 12 motion, the District Court stated 
that “notably absent from the Indictment . . . [were] any facts 
setting forth how defendant Huet aided and abetted defendant 
Hall in his unlawful possession of the SKS rifle.”  United 
States v. Huet, No. 08-0215, 2010 WL 4853847, at *5 (W.D. 
Pa. Nov. 22, 2010).  The District Court did not limit its 
inquiry to the four corners of the Indictment, however, and 
examined additional information to discern the Government‟s 
theory of the case.  The District Court looked to materials 
produced pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, as well as record evidence from Hall‟s 
case.  Specifically, the Court relied upon statements set forth 
in the affidavit of probable cause supporting the search 
warrant,
4
 and remarks made by the prosecutor during Hall‟s 
                                              
4
 The affidavit provides, in pertinent part: 
Huet indicated that she was angry that 
Hall had been showing off an SKS assault rifle.  
Huet said that if it happened again, she would 
take it “back” to Morgan.  Huet further 
elaborated that she was worried that if Hall “gets 
in trouble with that, I get in trouble too.  Cause 
it‟s in my name, and he‟s got it.” 
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guilty plea hearing.
5
  Concluding that this evidence failed to 
establish any connection between Huet‟s actions and Hall‟s 
possession, the District Court granted Huet‟s Rule 12 motion 
to dismiss for failure to state an offense under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1) and § 2.  Huet, 2010 WL 4853847, at *7. 
The District Court‟s view of the Government‟s theory 
of the case similarly guided its approach to Huet‟s Second 
Amendment challenge.  Huet argued that even if Count Three 
did state an offense for aiding and abetting a felon in 
possession, under the factual scenario presented in this case, 
the charge violated her rights under the Second Amendment.  
The District Court agreed, finding that “to permit [the] 
Indictment to go forward . . . would be [to] countenanc[e] the 
total elimination of the right of a sane, non-felonious citizen 
to possess a firearm, in her home, simply because her 
paramour is a felon.”  Id. at *11.  “[T]o punish Huet, who has 
not been convicted of a felony . . . as a principal, violates the 
core of the Second Amendment right to keep arms,” the Court 
opined, because the conduct alleged to have aided and abetted 
was “purely possessory.”  Id. at *7; see id. at *11 
(characterizing Government‟s case as an attempt to 
                                              
5
 At Hall‟s guilty plea hearing, the Assistant U.S. 
Attorney stated: 
Mr. Hall lived with . . . Melissa Huet, . . . [who] 
had no prior record of which we are aware, but . 
. . bought firearms in her name for Morgan 
Jones, who on the side sold firearms. . . . Miss 
Huet would allow Mr. Hall to have access to 
those firearms.  In essence, that‟s the very basis 
of the charge against Mr. Hall. 
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“compound[] an inchoate offense upon another inchoate 
offense”).  Although the District Court did not explicitly 
designate the Second Amendment violation as an alternative 
basis for dismissal, it clearly viewed it as such.  Accordingly, 
we must address both the sufficiency of the Indictment and 
the Second Amendment challenge. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction over the District Court‟s 
order dismissing the Indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 3731.  
“[W]hen reviewing a motion to dismiss an indictment, our 
standard of review is mixed.”  United States v. Shenandoah, 
595 F.3d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).  We 
exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s legal 
conclusions and review any challenges to its factual findings 
for clear error.  Id.  Here, the primary question is not whether 
the District Court‟s findings of fact were erroneous, but 
whether the District Court was entitled to find and weigh 
facts at all.  This is a legal question, over which we exercise 
plenary review.  Id.  We also exercise plenary review over a 
constitutional challenge to the application of a statute.  United 
States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 88 n.2 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(citing United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 151 (3d Cir. 
2009)). 
III. 
A. 
 We first address the Government‟s contention that the 
District Court erred in concluding that, under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B), Count Three failed to state 
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an offense for aiding and abetting a felon in possession of a 
firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 2. 
1. 
 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c)(1) requires 
only that an indictment “be a plain, concise, and definite 
written statement of the essential facts constituting the 
offense charged.”  “[T]he Federal Rules „were designed to 
eliminate technicalities in criminal pleadings and are to be 
construed to secure simplicity in procedure.‟”  United States 
v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 110 (2007) (quoting United 
States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953)).  Although 
detailed allegations may have been required under a common 
law pleading regime, they “surely are not contemplated by 
[the Federal Rules].”  Id. 
 “It is well-established that „[a]n indictment returned by 
a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, . . . if valid on 
its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the 
merits.‟”  United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 
2007) (quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 
(1956)).  We have held that an indictment is facially sufficient 
if it “(1) contains the elements of the offense intended to be 
charged, (2) sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he 
must be prepared to meet, and (3) allows the defendant to 
show with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former 
acquittal or conviction in the event of a subsequent 
prosecution.”  Id. at 321 (citation omitted).  “[N]o greater 
specificity than the statutory language is required so long as 
there is sufficient factual orientation” to permit a defendant to 
prepare his defense and invoke double jeopardy.  United 
States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 280 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 
United States v. Rankin, 870 F.2d 109, 112 (3d. Cir. 1989)).  
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Generally, an indictment will satisfy these requirements 
where it informs the defendant of the statute he is charged 
with violating, lists the elements of a violation under the 
statute, and specifies the time period during which the 
violations occurred.  United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 
771 (3d Cir. 2005); see also United States v. McCarty, 862 
F.2d 143, 144, 148 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding indictment under 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) sufficient where it tracked the statutory 
language, stated the date and place of the alleged possession, 
and specifically identified the type of firearm involved).  In 
contrast, if an indictment fails to charge an essential element 
of the crime, it fails to state an offense.  United States v. 
Wander, 601 F.2d 1251, 1259 (3d Cir. 1979). 
In determining whether an indictment validly states the 
elements of the offense, we need not blindly accept a 
recitation in general terms of the elements of the offense.  
United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 685 (3d Cir. 2002).  
“Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B) allows a 
district court to review the sufficiency of the government‟s 
pleadings to . . . ensur[e] that legally deficient charges do not 
go to a jury.”  United States v. Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257, 268 (3d 
Cir. 2011).  Although the Government is not required to set 
forth its entire case in the indictment, “if the specific facts” 
that are alleged “fall beyond the scope of the relevant 
criminal statute, as a matter of statutory interpretation,” the 
indictment fails to state an offense.  Panarella, 277 F.3d at 
685; see United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 162-66 (3d Cir. 
2010) (finding that indictment alleging “failure to rectify 
misstatements of others” did not, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, state an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and 
SEC Rule 10b-5).  However, the scope of a district court‟s 
review at the Rule 12 stage is limited.  “[A] pretrial motion to 
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dismiss an indictment is not a permissible vehicle for 
addressing the sufficiency of the government‟s evidence.”  
United States v. DeLaurentis, 230 F.3d 659, 660 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citations omitted).  “The government is entitled to 
marshal and present its evidence at trial, and have its 
sufficiency tested by a motion for acquittal pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.”  Id. at 661.  There is 
no criminal corollary to the civil summary judgment 
mechanism.  Id.  In evaluating a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, a 
district court must accept as true the factual allegations set 
forth in the indictment.  United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 
75, 78-79 (1962); United States v. Besmajian, 910 F.2d 1153, 
1154 (3d Cir. 1990).  “Evidentiary questions – such as 
credibility determinations and the weighing of proof – should 
not be determined at this stage.”  Bergrin, 650 F.3d at 265 
(internal marks and citation omitted).  Thus, a district court‟s 
review of the facts set forth in the indictment is limited to 
determining whether, assuming all of those facts as true, a 
jury could find that the defendant committed the offense for 
which he was charged.  Panarella, 277 F.3d at 685; 
DeLaurentis, 230 F.3d at 660. 
2. 
To survive Huet‟s motion to dismiss, the Government 
was required to adequately set forth the elements of aiding 
and abetting a felon in possession under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1) and § 2.  To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2, 
the government must prove:  “(1) that the substantive crime 
has been committed; and (2) that the defendant charged with 
aiding and abetting knew of the commission of the 
substantive offense and acted with intent to facilitate it.”  
United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 208 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(citation omitted).  Section 922(g)(1), the statute setting forth 
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the substantive offense, requires proof that:  (1) the defendant 
has been convicted of a crime of imprisonment for a term in 
excess of one year; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed the 
firearm; and (3) the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.  
United States v. Higdon, 638 F.3d 233, 239-40 (3d Cir. 2011).  
Because § 922(g)(1) is not a specific intent statute, an 
individual can be convicted as an aider and abettor under 
§ 922(g)(1) and § 2 if she knew or had reason to know that 
she was aiding and abetting possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon.  See United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 
1286-87 (3d Cir. 1993).  Thus, a valid indictment under 
§ 922(g)(1) based on an aiding and abetting theory must 
allege that:  (1) the principal, who had been convicted of a 
crime carrying a term of imprisonment in excess of one year, 
knowingly possessed a firearm that had traveled in interstate 
commerce, Higdon, 638 F.3d at 239-40, and (2) the defendant 
knew or had reason to know that the principal was prohibited 
from possessing a firearm, Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286-87, and 
rendered actual aid or assistance to the principal in possessing 
the firearm, United States v. Nolan, 718 F.2d 589, 592 (3d 
Cir. 1983). 
In this case, we conclude that the Indictment 
adequately set forth the required elements under § 922(g)(1) 
and § 2, with “sufficient factual orientation” to allow Huet to 
prepare her defense and invoke double jeopardy.  See Kemp, 
500 F.3d at 280.  Count Three lists all required elements of 
the offense.  It alleges that:  (1) Hall, the principal, had 
previously been convicted for Possession of Unregistered 
Firearms, an offense punishable by a term of imprisonment in 
excess of one year, and that he knowingly possessed a firearm 
(the SKS rifle) which had traveled in interstate commerce, see 
Higdon, 638 F.3d at 239-40; and (2) Huet knowingly aided 
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and abetted Hall‟s possession of that firearm, see Petersen, 
622 F.3d at 208; Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286-87.  Count Three also 
includes the required “factual orientation”:  it specifies the 
time period during which the violation occurred (“on or about 
August 10, 2007, to on or about January 11, 2008”), see 
Urban, 404 F.3d at 771, and identifies the specific weapon 
involved, see McCarty, 862 F.2d at 144.  No more was 
required to allow Huet to prepare her defense and invoke 
double jeopardy.  See Kemp, 500 F.3d at 280.  Accordingly, 
we will reverse the order of the District Court granting Huet‟s 
Rule 12(b)(3)(B) motion to dismiss for failure to state an 
offense.
6
 
 We recognize that the District Court may have adopted 
the novel procedure followed here to truncate what it 
perceived as an incurably weak Government case.  However, 
in doing so, the District Court committed two errors:  (1) it 
impermissibly expanded the scope of its review at the Rule 12 
stage and evaluated the sufficiency of the evidence; and (2) it 
required the Government to meet a heightened pleading 
standard.  We will discuss each of these issues in turn. 
 First, although the District Court purported to make a 
purely “legal” determination based on “undisputed” facts, 
Huet, 2010 WL 4853847, at *2, the language of its 
memorandum opinion makes clear that it engaged in fact-
finding and determined that, based on those facts, the 
Government would not be able to prove its case.  The District 
                                              
6
 Because we conclude that the Indictment should not 
have been dismissed, we do not address whether the District 
Court abused its discretion by dismissing the Indictment with 
prejudice. 
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Court speculated as to the evidence the Government would 
introduce at trial, and concluded that such evidence “[did] 
nothing to advance the cause that defendant Huet knew, or 
had reason to know that defendant Hall was a felon in 
possession and that her owning a weapon somehow aided or 
abetted him in his unlawful possession of the SKS rifle.”  Id. 
at *7.  By doing this, the District Court failed to adhere to the 
fundamental principle that in reviewing the sufficiency of an 
indictment, a court must accept as true all of the facts alleged.  
Panarella, 277 F.3d at 681; see United States v. Gallagher, 
602 F.2d 1139, 1142-43 (3d Cir. 1979).  “Evidentiary 
questions – such as . . . the weighing of proof – should not be 
determined at [the motion to dismiss] stage.”  Bergrin, 650 
F.3d at 265 (citation omitted). 
 Unlike other cases in which we have affirmed a district 
court‟s dismissal of an indictment as insufficient, Huet‟s case 
does not involve a question of whether the facts alleged in the 
indictment fall beyond the scope of the relevant criminal 
statute as a matter of statutory interpretation.  See Panarella, 
277 F.3d at 685; see also Schiff, 602 F.3d at 161, 167 
(holding that failure to rectify the misstatements of others 
does not state an offense under federal securities laws and 
thus the government could not proceed on such a theory); 
Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Greenidge, 600 F.2d 437, 438 
(3d Cir. 1979) (finding indictment for assault with intent to 
commit rape under 14 V.I.C. § 295(3) insufficient where the 
facts alleged showed that the person the defendant assaulted 
 14 
was not the same person he attempted to rape).
7
  Rather, the 
District Court‟s determination that the Indictment failed to 
state an offense was based solely on its assessment of the 
strength of the Government‟s case. 
 Moreover, although we have left open the possibility 
that, in limited circumstances, a district court may be able to 
address the sufficiency of the government‟s evidence in a 
pretrial motion to dismiss, this case does not present such a 
scenario.  See DeLaurentis, 230 F.3d at 660 (acknowledging 
that district courts may be able to address sufficiency of the 
evidence if there is a stipulated record or if immunity issues 
are implicated).
8
  The District Court erred in concluding that 
                                              
7
 The only potential question of statutory interpretation 
– whether the SKS rifle was a “dangerous” or “unusual” 
firearm – was determined by the District Court when it took 
judicial notice of the fact that the SKS rifle was not an 
“assault weapon,” but instead had been designated as a 
“curio” by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 
and was used primarily by hunters and collectors.  See United 
States v. Huet, No. 08-0215, 2010 WL 4853847, at *4-5 
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2010).  That finding is not at issue on 
appeal. 
8
 Although DeLaurentis indicated that there is an 
exception to the general rule barring district courts from 
considering the sufficiency of the evidence at the Rule 12 
stage, we have never explicitly held that such an exception 
exists, much less defined its contours.  We decline to do so 
now.  We simply hold that, assuming an exception exists for 
cases involving a stipulated record or immunity issues, the 
circumstances of this case do not trigger it. 
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the facts here are undisputed.  The Government maintains that 
it will introduce testimony to prove the elements of aiding 
and abetting.  At no point during the proceedings before the 
District Court did the Government concede that the facts were 
undisputed or were complete.  In its reply to Huet‟s motion to 
dismiss, the Government explicitly stated that it was 
“prepared to present testimony” at trial that would establish 
that Huet aided and abetted Hall‟s possession.  The 
Government maintains this position on appeal.  Thus, the 
District Court‟s finding that the Government lacked evidence 
beyond mere possession was premature.
9
 
                                              
9
 We note that there is a split among our sister circuits 
as to whether a district court is ever permitted to rule on a 
motion to dismiss based on the sufficiency of the evidence.  
Some courts have indicated that in “rare” and “unusual” 
cases, it may be appropriate for a court to look to the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  See, e.g., United States v. Levin, 
973 F.2d 463, 466-67 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming district 
court‟s dismissal of an indictment under Rule 12 where the 
prosecutor conceded that the facts were undisputed, and based 
on the undisputed facts, the defendant could not have formed 
the requisite intent to commit the crime).  Other circuits have 
rejected this approach.  See, e.g., United States v. Salman, 378 
F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that “there is no 
explicit authority to grant a pre-trial judgment as a matter of 
law on the merits under the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure” and thus, the government should be allowed to 
present its evidence at trial, subject to the defendant‟s moving 
for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 29). 
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Second, the District Court erred to the extent that it 
imposed a heightened pleading standard for offenses under 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 2.  The District Court dismissed 
Count Three based on its determination that “[t]he facts in the 
Indictment fail[ed] to set forth any allegations to support the 
conclusion that . . . Huet aided and abetted . . . Hall in his 
unlawful possession of the SKS rifle.”  Huet, 2010 WL 
4853847, at *7.  The District Court faulted the Government 
for failing to include “any specifics” as to how Huet aided 
Hall, and determined that the Government simply “charge[d] 
its conclusion.”  Id. at *4.  Although some offenses must be 
pled with greater specificity than the “plain, concise, and 
definite written statement” contemplated by Rule 7(c)(1), we 
have never held aiding and abetting a felon in possession 
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 2 to be such an offense, 
and we decline to do so now. 
In arguing for a heightened pleading standard, Huet 
attempts to distinguish the Supreme Court‟s decision in 
United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (2007).  In 
that case, the issue was whether an indictment alleging 
attempted illegal reentry into the United States under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1326(a) had to allege a specific overt act.  Id. at 103-04.  
The Court held that the government did not have to include 
such an allegation because the use of the word “attempt,” 
coupled with the specification of the time and place of the 
defendant‟s attempted reentry, was sufficient to put the 
defendant on notice of the charges against him.  Id. at 108.  
The Court distinguished the heightened pleading 
requirements under 2 U.S.C. § 192, which makes it illegal for 
a witness summoned before a congressional committee to 
refuse to answer any question “pertinent to the question under 
inquiry.”  Id. at 109.  Because the “relevant hearing‟s subject 
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[is] frequently uncertain but invariably „central to every 
prosecution under the statute,‟” the Court explained that an 
indictment under § 192 must go beyond the language of the 
statute and “allege the subject of the congressional hearing in 
order to determine whether the defendant‟s refusal was 
„pertinent.‟”  Id. (citing Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 
749, 764 (1962)).  In contrast, because the term “attempt,” as 
used in “common parlance,” connotes action and intent, it 
was deemed unnecessary to specify an overt act in an 
indictment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).  Id. at 107.  Huet argues 
that because “a single affirmative act” may establish an aider 
and abettor‟s culpability, a “concise statement as to [the] 
means and/or manner the aider/abetter (sic) used to facilitate 
the offense is required.”  We find Huet‟s attempt to 
distinguish “aid and abet” from “attempt” unpersuasive.  Like 
the term “attempt,” the terms “aid” and “abet,” as used in 
common parlance, sufficiently connote action and intent.  See 
Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. at 107.  Thus, unlike 2 U.S.C. 
§ 192, no more than the elements of the statute and the time 
and place of the alleged violation are required to inform the 
defendant of the charge against which she must defend and 
enable her to invoke double jeopardy.  See Kemp, 500 F.3d at 
280. 
 Moreover, the District Court‟s suggestion that 
Abuelhawa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2102 (2009), altered 
the pleading requirements for offenses involving accomplice 
liability is a mischaracterization of the Supreme Court‟s 
holding in that case.  In Abuelhawa, the Court held that 
making a misdemeanor drug purchase over the telephone 
does not constitute “facilitation” of drug distribution under 21 
U.S.C. § 843(b).  Id. at 2104.  Nowhere in the Abuelhawa 
opinion did the Court address the pleading requirements 
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under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7.  Nor did the 
decision modify the law of accomplice liability under 18 
U.S.C. § 2.  The elements of aiding and abetting under § 2 
remain the same.  The Abuelhawa Court simply addressed a 
narrow question regarding the scope of the term “facilitate” 
under § 843(b).  129 S. Ct. at 2104.  We decline to extend its 
holding any further. 
 19 
B. 
1. 
 We turn now to Huet‟s Second Amendment challenge.  
The Second Amendment provides:  “A well regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. II.  In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570, 595 (2008), the Supreme Court held for the first 
time that the Second Amendment confers an individual right 
to keep and bear arms.
10
  The right, however, is not unlimited.  
Id.  The Second Amendment does not guarantee a “right to 
keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner 
whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”  Id. at 626.  The Court 
cautioned that, “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast 
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the 
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”  Id. at 626-27.  
Laws prohibiting the possession of “dangerous and unusual 
weapons” were left similarly intact.  Id. at 627.  The Court 
made clear that it was “identify[ing] these presumptively 
                                              
10
 In McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 
(2010), a splintered plurality of the Supreme Court held that 
the Second Amendment is applicable to the states, through 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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lawful regulatory measures only as examples”; the list was 
not intended to be exhaustive.
11
  Id. at 627 n.26. 
 Applying these principles, the Court invalidated a 
District of Columbia law that completely banned handgun 
possession in the home and required any lawful firearm to be 
kept disassembled and bound by a trigger lock at all times, 
rendering it inoperable.  Id. at 628-35.  The Court explained 
that “the inherent right of self-defense [is] central to the 
Second Amendment[,]” and the challenged law impermissibly 
extended to the home, “where the need for defense of self, 
family, and property is most acute.”  Id. at 628.  Although the 
Court did not decide on a level of scrutiny to be applied in 
cases involving Second Amendment challenges, it rejected 
rational basis review.  Id. at 628 n.27.  The Court explained 
that the Second Amendment “elevates above all other 
interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use 
arms in defense of hearth and home.”  Id. at 635. 
                                              
11
 Although some of our sister circuits have classified 
the “presumptively lawful” language in Heller as dicta, see 
United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 
2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring), we disagree.  In United 
States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 2011), we 
explicitly held that Heller‟s list of “presumptively lawful” 
regulations was not dicta, and thus we are bound by it.  See 
also United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 n.6 (11th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (explaining that Heller Court‟s “presumptively 
lawful” list was a limitation on the scope of its holding). 
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 In United States v. Marzzarella, we articulated a two-
step analysis for Second Amendment claims under Heller: 
First, we ask whether the challenged law 
imposes a burden on conduct falling within the 
scope of the Second Amendment‟s guarantee. 
. . . If it does not, our inquiry is complete.  If it 
does, we evaluate the law under some form of 
means-end scrutiny.  If the law passes muster 
under that standard, it is constitutional.  If it 
fails, it is invalid. 
614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citations 
omitted). 
Under the Marzzarella framework, the “presumptively 
lawful” regulatory measures identified by the Supreme Court 
in Heller carry the presumption of validity because they 
regulate conduct “falling outside the scope of the Second 
Amendment‟s guarantee.”  United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 
168, 172 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91) 
(explaining that this is a better reading of Heller than one that 
would require “presumptively lawful” regulations to satisfy 
every level of constitutional scrutiny).  In other words, the 
longstanding limitations mentioned by the Court in Heller are 
exceptions to the right to bear arms.  Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 
91. 
2. 
The constitutional question here is presented in an 
unusual way due to the procedural posture of the case.  The 
District Court‟s characterization of Huet‟s challenge as an as-
applied attack is somewhat misleading.  In contrast to a facial 
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attack, an as-applied challenge “does not contend that a law is 
unconstitutional as written but that its application to a 
particular person under particular circumstances deprived that 
person of a constitutional right.”  United States v. Marcavage, 
609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  
However, because we do not have the benefit of a fully 
developed evidentiary record, the “particular circumstances” 
of this case remain unclear.  As in its analysis regarding the 
sufficiency of the Indictment, the District Court‟s error on the 
constitutional issue stems from its failure to accept as true the 
allegations in the Indictment.  Because, as we explained 
above, the charges against Huet were properly brought under 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 7 and 12, in assessing 
Huet‟s constitutional challenge on appeal, we are limited to 
determining whether, based on the allegations in the 
Indictment – and only the allegations in the Indictment – her 
Second Amendment rights have been violated.  For the 
reasons set forth below, we conclude that a charge properly 
brought under § 922(g)(1) and § 2 does not violate the Second 
Amendment. 
Huet argues that based on the circumstances of her 
case, she cannot constitutionally be charged with aiding and 
abetting a felon to possess a firearm.  Specifically, she 
contends that the Government‟s only evidence is that she 
possessed the SKS rifle in her home while living with a 
convicted felon.  The District Court agreed, finding that “to 
permit [the] Indictment to go forward” would be to 
“countenance[e] the total elimination of the right of a sane, 
non-felonious citizen to possess a firearm, in her home, 
simply because her paramour is a felon.”  Huet, 2010 WL 
4853847, at *11. 
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We disagree.  We cannot say that an indictment which 
properly alleges aiding and abetting a felon in possession 
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 2 violates the Second 
Amendment under Heller.  Applying Marzzarella, a properly-
brought aiding and abetting charge does not burden conduct 
protected by the Second Amendment.  See 614 F.3d at 89.  
The District Court‟s characterization of the Indictment as 
seeking to criminalize the otherwise legal possession of a 
firearm by a non-felon simply because she lives with a felon 
is misleading.  The Indictment does not allege that Huet‟s 
possession of the SKS rifle violated the law; rather, it alleges 
that Huet aided and abetted Hall to possess the firearm.  We 
are mindful of the risk that felon dispossession statutes, when 
combined with laws regarding accomplice liability, may be 
misused to subject law-abiding cohabitants to liability simply 
for possessing a weapon in the home.  However, in this case, 
the District Court‟s determination that the Government 
overreached was premature.  Huet‟s arguments regarding the 
circumstances of her possession must await further 
development of the evidentiary record. 
Huet‟s argument that her status as a non-felon brings 
her case within the scope of Second Amendment protection is 
unavailing.  Relying on our decision in United States v. 
Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011), Huet argues that, as a 
person legally entitled to own a firearm, she is categorically 
different than a felon, and thus cannot be charged under 
§ 922(g)(1) for possessing a firearm.  This argument is 
flawed.  Huet‟s status in relation to prohibited persons is 
irrelevant.  She is correct that her circumstances distinguish 
her from “persons historically barred from Second 
Amendment protections”; she is not barred from Second 
Amendment protection at all.  The Government readily 
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concedes that Huet would not violate § 922(g)(1) simply by 
possessing a firearm.  She would, however, violate 
§ 922(g)(1) and § 2 by aiding and abetting a felon to possess 
a firearm.  Count Three charges her with the latter.  Thus, the 
fact that she is not within the class of persons prohibited from 
possessing a firearm is irrelevant; her right to possess a 
firearm is not implicated by the charges against her.  
Moreover, even if part of the conduct that allegedly aided and 
abetted Hall‟s possession involved possession of the firearm 
by Huet, the Second Amendment does not afford citizens a 
right to carry arms for “any purpose.”  Heller, 554 U.S. at 
595.  Huet‟s right to keep the SKS rifle in her home did not 
give her the right to facilitate Hall‟s possession of the 
weapon.  Otherwise illegal conduct does not somehow 
become immunized because possession of a firearm is 
involved in the offense.  See, e.g., United States v. Potter, 630 
F.3d 1260, 1261 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (rejecting a 
defendant‟s challenge to his conviction for possession of a 
firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking and concluding that 
“[e]ven if [the defendant] kept the firearm also to protect 
himself and his home,” it could not “seriously be contended 
that the Second Amendment guarantees a right to use a 
firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking”). 
Because the conduct alleged in Count Three is beyond 
the scope of Second Amendment protection, our inquiry 
under Marzzarella is complete.  See 614 F.3d at 89.  We need 
not conduct a means-end inquiry.  See id.  However, in 
Marzzarella, we cautioned that because Second Amendment 
jurisprudence is “in its nascency,” we must tread carefully 
when deciding whether to find conduct not explicitly 
identified by the Heller Court as subject to “presumptively 
lawful” restrictions as unprotected by the Second 
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Amendment.  Id. at 101.  In other words, prong one of 
Marzzarella (whether conduct is protected by the Second 
Amendment) should be applied with caution.  Because we 
could not be certain that the provision at issue in Marzzarella, 
18 U.S.C. § 922(k), which prohibits possession of a firearm 
with an obliterated serial number, regulated conduct not 
protected by the Second Amendment, we declined to decide 
the case on prong one.  Id. at 94-95.  However, because it is 
clear to us that the allegations in Count Three fall outside the 
scope of Second Amendment protection, we do not hesitate to 
base our decision on prong one of Marzzarella in this case. 
Our primary concern in Marzzarella was one of line-
drawing, specifically, whether a firearm with an obliterated 
serial number was a “dangerous and unusual weapon.”  614 
F.3d at 87, 94-95.  Although the Court in Heller stated that 
possession of “dangerous” firearms is not protected, it did not 
define what constitutes a “dangerous” firearm.  See 554 U.S. 
at 627.  In Marzzarella, we noted the difficulty in determining 
whether a gun with an obliterated serial number was 
“dangerous” or “unusual.”  614 F.3d at 101.  On the one 
hand, because an unmarked firearm is equally effective as a 
marked firearm, thus giving law-abiding citizens no reason to 
prefer the former over the latter, unmarked firearms “have 
value primarily for persons seeking to use them for illicit 
purposes.”  Id. at 95 (citations omitted).  On the other hand, 
the absence of a serial number seems categorically different 
than other “dangerous” characteristics, such as a sawed-off 
barrel on a shotgun.  Id.  Although a sawed-off shotgun “is 
dangerous and unusual in that its concealability fosters its use 
in illicit activity, it is also dangerous and unusual because of 
its heightened capability to cause damage.”  Id. (citing United 
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States v. Amos, 501 F.3d 524, 532 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(McKeague, J., dissenting)). 
Huet‟s case presents no line-drawing problem.  
Because § 922(g)(1) and § 2 do not restrict the right of 
possession of the aider and abettor, Count Three simply does 
not implicate Huet‟s rights under the Second Amendment.  
Thus, unlike the restriction at issue in Marzzarella, we do not 
have to broaden any of Heller‟s presumptively valid 
categories to find that the conduct alleged in Count Three is 
outside the scope of Second Amendment protection.  See 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 101. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of 
the District Court granting Huet‟s motion to dismiss and 
remand for further proceedings.  We hold that:  (1) Count 
Three was sufficient to state an offense for aiding and 
abetting a felon in possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 
and § 2; and (2) Count Three does not violate the Second 
Amendment. 
